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Associate Editors, Mr. M. Toscan Bennett, 19O1, and Mr. John
Hillard, 19O1.
LIMITATIONS OF THE HEIGHT OF BUILDINGS-EMINENT DOMAIN.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Attorney-General v.
WMiams, 55 N. E. 77, affirms the power of the Legislature to limit the
height of buildings for new purposes and on new grounds. The problem
was to preserve the beauty of Copley Square, a public park, and save as
much light and air as possible to the Boston Public Library, the Museum
of Fine Arts, Trinity Church, the New Old South Church, the Second
Church of Boston, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which
abut on this square. A statute was passed limiting to ninety feet the height
of all buildings so abutting. St. 1898 C. 452.
Exclusive of the war-power which may be said to arise from the changed
status of the government, the power inherent in every sovereignty to regu-
late, restrict, or terminate the enjoyment of property by its owner is com-
prised under three heads, taxation, police, eminent domain. The first cannot
operate solely upon a single individual, its burdens must be proportionate,
and no specific property may be taken except upon failure of the owner to
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pay the money sum assessed. The second is of its nature specific, but may
be exercised only for the preservation of the public morals, health, peace, or
safety. With the last, either as an inherent attribute or subsequent limita-
tion, is connected the right of the owner to just compensation. Kohl v.
United States, 9I U. S. 371; Lewis Eminent Domain, § 3; Commonwealth v.
Alger, 7 Cush. 53; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 406. But the purposes for
which property may be taken are here more numerous by reason of this
very restriction of just compensation. It is but a compulsory alienation of
the whole or a part to public uses for a fair price. The courts have said in
effect that any reasonable benefit or utility to the public under the circum-
stances of the case would justify the exercise of eminent domain at the dis-
cretion of the Legislature. Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532; Beekman v.
Railroad Co., 3 Paige 73. It has been applied in aid of almshouses, ceme-
teries, memorial halls, monumental statues, public baths, parks, and even
a restaurant at a summer resort. As the court in this case says, "the uses
which should be deemed public in reference to the right of the Legislature
to compel an individual to part with his property for a compensation are
being enlarged with the progress of the people in education and refinement."
It is only within a few years that lands have been taken for public parks.
Now the right to take land for this purpose is generally recognized and
frequently exercised. Foster v. Commissioners, 133 Mass. 321; Shoemaker v.
United States, 147 U. S. 282; Matter of Commissioners of Central Park, 63
Bart. 282.
The Legislature very wisely, therefore, in considering the capacity in
which it should act, chose that of eminent domain, and provided for compen-
sation to those whose property from ninety feet above the earth to the sky
was thus taken. And when the constitutionality of the act was brought to
bar the court did not hesitate to declare in its favor as in every respect in
accordance with the laws regulating.the taking of private property by right
of eminent domain. The reasons which justify the taking of land for a pub-
lic park will justify the- expenditure of money for its improvement and
adornment. The Legislature was seeking to promote the beauty and attrac-
tiveness of a public park and to prevent unreasonable encroachments on the
light and air it had previously received. The court refused to say that this
was not such a matter of public interest as to call for the expenditure of
public money, and to justify the taking of private property.
The decision of this point alone would not be so significant as the" legis-
latures of few States could be persuaded to limit the height of buildings
around the open squares of their cities and appropriate the money from the
treasury to pay the damages. But the statute provided that any damages
that might be assessed should be paid from the municipal treasury of Boston,
thus placing the burden approximately on those receiving the benefits.
Moreover, it is unlikely that in assessing damages the benefit of the im-
proved park to the owner of each particular property was forgotten, and
without doubt the burden was very light. Both statute and decision seem
to us eminently sensible and replete with suggestion to the legislatures of
other States and the people of many of our larger cities.
TRADE-NAMES-HISTORICAL SOCIETIES.
The Supreme Court of New York in the recent case of Colonial Dames
of America v. Colonial Dames of State of New York, 6o N. Y. Sup. 3o2, has
laid down some interesting law on the subject of trade-names. The two
societies engaged in the dispute as to the right to use the names they have
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adopted, were organized at about the same time. For several years they
made no objection to the use of their respective names, and there was no
confusion as to their identity, except some confusion of mail. Their pur-
pose was to promote the study of American history, to perpetuate the
memory of the men and events of colonial times and preserve the relics of
those days. These purposes and aims of the society give a unique aspect to
the case. The business character of the associations that had hitherto been
interested in legal controversies on the subject of trade-names, had caused
the law to develop along a somewhat different line from that pursued by
the New York courts in the present case. The damage that would result
from the public being misled through a similarity of names, in their deal-
ings with associations of a large and important business character, and the
injury to the party aggrieved, has been the controlling influence in the pre-
vious decisions of the courts on this subject. We find this well expressed in
Holmes, Booth & Hayden v. Holmes, Booth & Atwood Manufacturing Co., 37
Conn. 278, and the principle upon which this subject is founded explained in
Celluloid Manufacturing Co. v. Celluite Manufacturing Co., 32 Fed. 94, as well
as in the cases cited in Central Lard Co. v. Fairbank, 64 Fed. 133. From these
authorities we can take it to be the law that a court will interfere by injunc-
tion when two business firms have names so similar as to practically perpe-
trate a fraud on the public, or where the similarity is a source of injury to
the party seeking relief in equity.
It is not enough, however, that the public is likely to be misled or that
one of the firms is likely to suffer damage. There must be some more
definite injury to the party asking for the injunction than what is a mere
probability. Commercial Advertiser v. Haynes, 49 N. Y. Sup. 438. The pres-
ent case could have been decided on this point alone. There was no injury
suffered by the Colonial Dames of the State of New York, except that a
few letters addressed to them went astray in the mails. But the court seems
to have gone further. They argue that the public is never likely to be misled,
so as to be seriously injured, by an association formed for unselfish and
patriotic purposes, and- that neither association itself can be injured by the
other in what it does for the public through motives of generosity and
patriotism. They are not money-making concerns. They do not exist for
the financial benefit of their members. They need not fear competition, and
their objection to a name similar to that they have adopted is dictated more
by jealousy than a legitimate desire to stand their ground in the struggle
for commercial existence. There is an inconsistency in an association
whose object is to voluntarily glorify the deeds and accomplishments of
American history, objecting to any one else doing it under the same name.
It is even absurd, and we cannot help but agree with the New York courts
in the view they have taken of the present case. Hereafter the first questioil
to be asked in cases of restraint for similarity of trade-names will be: "Do
the associations concerned fall within the class designated by the court as
those existing for 'patriotic and unselfish ends,' or are they ordinary busi-
ness firms?"
DEAD BODIES-RIGHT TO REMOVE.
In the case of Toppin v. Moriarity, 44 At. Rep. 469, the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey renders a decision of some interest, inasmuch as
the controversy was of a rather novel and unusual character. The com-
plainant sought by injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering
with the removal of the remains of his daughter, who was the wife of the
defendant. On her death bed the daughter expressed a wish to be buried
in the same plot with her father and mother. To carry out this wish her
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father purchased a plot, in which she was buried, with the concurrence
of her husband. Very shortly after the burial, her mother being dissatisfied
with the situation of the plot, a new plot was obtained by exchange, and
plaintiff was about to disinter the body, when defendant raised objections.
The plaintiff had caused considerable money to be expended in erecting a
monument and in improving the new plot. The defendant had knowledge
of the exchange, and also of the improvements being made, but remained
silent.
It has long since been established that the common law recognizes no
property right in a dead body, 2 Black. Com. 429. It is held, however, that
the right of burial is a legal right, and that it rests exclusively, in the absence
of a testamentary disposition, in the next of kin-that phrase being con-
strued in favor of the surviving husband or wife. Durell v. Hayward, 9 Gray
248; Weld v. Walker, i3o Mass. 422; Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307; Foley v.
Phelps, i N. Y. App. Div. 55i. And that the husband is obliged to bury
his wife. Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574; Waesch's Estate, 166 Pa. St.
204; Matter of Weringer, ioo Cal. 345. It has also generally been held
that after burial, if all the parties interested have consented thereto, the sur-
viving spouse has no right to remove the body of the deceased against the
consent of the next of kin. Fox v. Gordon, I6 Phila. (Pa.) 185; Peters v.
Peters, 43 N. J. Eq. 14o; Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, io R_ I. ±2; Thomp-
son v. Deeds, 93 Iowa 228. Nor can the next of kin remove the remains
against the will of the surviving spouse. Secor Case, Alb. L. J. 70.
The peculiarity of the present case consists in that by reason of the
action of the wife's parents, it has become necessary to disinter the remains.
In cases of this character the question involved resolves itself into one of
duty, rather than of right, strictly, so-called. The court, in granting the
injunction, proceeds: "Is the husband in a position to prevent the removal?
If I am right in the view I have taken, namely, that he is not vested with a
right, but charged with a duty, it is apparent that in designating his wife's
father's plot as a final resting place of her remains, and in seeing that she
was interred there, he did what would ordinarily amount to a complete
performance of his duty. If, in consequence of the new situation, a new
duty has arisen, he is in the performance of it, subject to the controlling
power of this court as the successor to the ecclesiastical court. If nothing
else appeared than that, for some reason or other, it was necessary to remove
the body, then he, as husband and administrator, would, a controversy
arising, be permitted to select another resting place. But there are two
additional facts in the case at bar, which it seems to me make it the duty
of the husband to allow his wife's body to be buried in the lot prepared for
it. These facts are: First, his wife's request that she should be buried with
her family, and his assent thereto after her death; second, his conduct in
assenting to the exchange of the lots, and in allowing the work upon the
new plot to proceed without objection, at great expense to complainant.
As the fundamental conception in the growth of all law should be that
which is just and righteous, it seems that the doctrine established by the
case under review is a salutory one. Although the resting place of the dead
should at all times be considered as sacred, and an interference with
the same ought never be tolerated, save for good reason, and then only with
the consent of all immediately concerned, yet to allow one to stand by in
silence and permit another to resort to large expenditures in the location
of another place of sepulcher, and then, actuated by a malevolent spirit,
withhold the necessary consent, thus rendering the labors of such other
a practical nullity, would not only shock the conscience, but also pervert
those rules of human action, so firmly established, which guide man in his
daily relations with others."
